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A. What Are Tax Expenditures?
1.
Tax expenditures are government revenues foregone as a result of differential, or preferential, treatment of specific sectors, activities, regions, or agents. They can take many forms, including allowances (deductions from the base), exemptions (exclusions from the base), rate relief (lower rates), credits (reductions in liability) and tax deferrals (postponing payments). International comparisons are complicated by different methodologies and assessments as to what constitute a tax expenditure, but the practice is pervasive, and tax expenditures in Italy are clearly elevated.
Tax Expenditures in Selected Advanced Economies (Percent of GDP)
Sources: OECD (2010); United States, National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2010) . Note: Higher values may arise from more comprehensve reporting (recent estimates for Italy are higher due to change in benchmark).
B. Why Should Tax Expenditures Be Reformed?

2.
Tax expenditures can have major consequences for the fairness, complexity, efficiency and effectiveness of not only the tax system itself but, since they often serve purposes that might be (or are also) pursued through public spending, of the wider fiscal system.
Tax expenditures can compromise fairness.
Tax expenditures can be a poor way of pursuing equity objectives: in a progressive tax system, for instance, any policy that reduces taxable income will benefit most those in the highest marginal tax bracket and convey no benefit to those out of the tax system, a potential reason for using tax credits (or spending measures) instead. The tax expenditures associated with the reduced VAT rates in Italy, for instance, in themselves increase progressivity-but much of the benefit will go to the better off, so that the same equity objectives could likely be pursued at less cost through social spending.
Tax expenditures can be inefficient and poorly targeted. Tax expenditures can create unintended or unwelcome distortions: the current deduction of mortgage interest, for instance, may have been appropriate when imputed income from owner-occupation was effectively taxable, but now simply encourages leveraged housing finance.
Tax expenditures are vulnerable to lobbying. Special interest groups may find it easier to argue for tax breaks than for explicit spending support. Tax expenditures often bypass the scrutiny accorded to spending in the regular budget and may not require annual renewal in the budgetary process-this lack of transparency may explain some of the appeal they hold for policy makers.
C. Are All Tax Expenditures Bad?
3.
Not all tax expenditures are necessarily bad. For example, tax expenditures could benefit from administrative economies of scale-as they usually deliver their "rewards" through a reduction in taxes that would have been paid anyway, spending ministries do not need to allocate resources to administering substitute programs in either cash or kind.
4.
Not all tax expenditures are unjustifiable tax loopholes (Buckley, 2011) . In fact, tax expenditures can also be a way of achieving fair and efficient taxation: the largest single tax expenditure in Italy is a tax credit that serves the same purpose as basic tax-free thresholds serve elsewhere. The table below provides a comparison of tax expenditures and direct spending, summarizing the main costs and benefits.
Table 1. Comparison of Tax Expenditures and Direct Spending
5.
While generalizations are difficult, the literature points to some guidelines for incorporating tax expenditures within an optimal tax framework. For income taxes, broadly defined bases allow for lower marginal rates, while generously defined exemptions can help with equity goals and also reduce compliance and administrative costs. Standard allowances
Tax Expenditures
Direct Spending
Accessibility for beneficiaries
Simple, because of their automatic nature. More complex, requiring selection.
Administrative and compliance costs
High, if exemptions are properly monitored. Medium, due to necessity of a selection and allocation system. can reduce equity but are simpler to enforce (see Alm, 1996 , for a fuller discussion). Consumption taxes should be largely proportional-any divergences should focus on higher rates for goods and services that are unresponsive to price changes or that generate negative spillovers (Alm, 1996) . Welfare objectives are likely best pursued through well targeted subsidies (Johansson et al., 2008) .
D. How Can Tax Expenditures Be Identified and Quantified?
6. Identifying and quantifying tax expenditures are critical for an understanding, and informed public discussion, of the overall impact of the tax system. The first step is the definition of a benchmark tax system. It is this norm that allows identification of provisions in the tax system that are part of this tax norm and those that are not. However, there is no consensus on how to define a tax norm.
7.
The main distinction is between approaches that use a norm based on theoretical concepts of income, consumption, or value-added taxes and those that use a country's own tax laws as a basis to define the benchmark, isolating differential or preferential treatment judged as tax expenditures (e.g. targeted provisions to address specific policy objectives). The former will classify as tax expenditures elements which might otherwise be considered part of tax design. Once tax expenditures have been identified, the second step is to quantify the budgetary cost of the individual tax expenditure "policies." Most countries estimate the loss in government revenue due to the tax expenditure, based on the actual uptake of the differential treatment. Substantial work has already been undertaken on the identification and quantification of tax expenditures in Italy. A report, commissioned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), identifies and costs 720 tax expenditures amounting to about 16 percent of GDP. 3 The MEF, by choosing the conceptual approach to identifying the benchmark, provides very extensive coverage by international standards; however, it would be neither feasible nor desirable to eliminate all the tax expenditures identified. 
9.
Clear and frequent evaluation of the identified tax expenditure is necessary for scaling back those not generating benefits commensurate to their cost. This is not always straightforward, in that the impact of tax expenditures on behavior is often hard to identify; but even in such cases, some sense can be given of whether it is plausible that the response is large enough to warrant the costs incurred. As a start, tax expenditures should be evaluated within the framework used to analyze the tax system as a whole:
1. Does the tax expenditure promote or hinder economic efficiency? To what extent does it influence taxpayer behavior in desirable ways or distort behavior in undesirable ways?
2. Is the tax expenditure fair? Are similar individuals treated similarly? Does the tax expenditure account for individuals' different capacities to bear the burden of taxation?
3. Is the tax expenditure simple and easily administered? This includes calculating tax liability, filing taxes, government administration, enforcement and ease of evasion.
4. Is the tax expenditure vulnerable to lobbying? Does the tax expenditure benefit very specific interests groups and how frequently are costs and benefits scrutinized?
10.
It is also important to compare tax expenditures with alternative spending measures and, more generally, to assess them in the light of what can be achieved on the spending side. For example, some of the tax expenditures with social objectives, such as the dependent relative tax credit, potentially overlap with the objectives of social assistance programs run through the social security system-the relative costs and merits of both delivery options need to be considered.
F. What Types of Tax Expenditures Are There in Italy?
Personal Income Tax (PIT)
11.
Establishing the relevant benchmark for the personal income tax is not easy, as it is a prime tax instrument for redistribution. While the literature offers some guidance on what is optimal (i.e. a natural benchmark), it requires a subjective assessment of the equity-efficiency trade-off. Some targeted allowances can be desirable, but in practice many are often not effective. In Italy, tax expenditures were measured both against a measure of comprehensive economic income (consumption plus change in net worth) and also against a dual income tax (DIT) system, which taxes labor income at progressive rates but capital income at a low single rate. 5 5 A DIT differs from a 'comprehensive' income tax in distinguishing between capital and labor income (rather than subjecting the sum of the two to a single progressive scale). To avoid arbitrage opportunities and facilitate implementation, the textbook prescription is to set the corporate income tax rate equal to the single rate on capital income. See IMF (2012) for a fuller discussion.
12.
Many of the largest identified PIT tax expenditures are arguably desirable parts of a normal tax system. Table 2 summarizes the largest PIT tax expenditures, collectively worth over 5 percent of GDP. 
13.
The largest single item is a universal tax credit that compensates for the lack of an income tax threshold, which Italy does not have but many other countries do. Consequently, it can be seen as a key component of a progressive income tax system. Similarly, the 2 nd largest tax expenditure in this category allows capital income to be taxed at a low and (almost) uniform rate. As such, it is an intrinsic part of the DIT system. The third largest item is a tax credit for dependent relatives, which in many countries is considered a measure of ability to pay and hence contributes to the fairness of the tax system. Arguably, of the largest PIT tax expenditures, the tax credit for medical expenses and health services is one that most likely could be replaced by a better targeted expenditure program. 14.
Corporate Income Tax (CIT)
To measures CIT tax expenditures a concept of net business profit was applied. The largest CIT tax expenditure is a measure to avoid double taxation of foreign sourced dividends. Other measures, although less a feature of a normal CIT system, could have their merits in the current environment, such as the deductibility of social security costs from the regional business value added tax (IRAP). This measure was introduced to reduce the labor tax wedge and incentivize hiring by firms. Other CIT tax expenditures, such as those to incentivize restructuring and mergers, should be weighed against other policy options for achieving this objective, such as a streamlining of court processes.
15.
An important element of corporate/business taxation in Italy is the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE). It is an important example of a provision that looks like a tax expenditure, but can also be considered a key element of tax design. By providing a tax deduction for a notional return on additional equity injected into companies, this system reduces the cost of such finance and eases the tax incentive to use debt rather than equity finance. It constitutes an important step toward greater neutrality for business investment and financing decisions, taking Italy closer to a form of "dual income tax". 
Value Added Tax (VAT)
16.
A uniform rate with a broad base is a good benchmark as the VAT is not a good instrument either to address externalities, or to deal with redistribution. The information requirements needed to operate a differential VAT regime that improves (rather than worsens) economic welfare is so onerous as to make it impractical. Moreover, the welfare objectives are most probably better achieved through special excise taxes or direct subsidies rather than by a multi-rate VAT system (Johansson et al., 2008 Full deduction from IRAP tax base of SSC costs related to permanent workers; full deduction from PIT and CIT tax base of IRAP on labour costs (plus partial deductability of interests costs). 1/ 6.69 0.43 Provision mainly to reduce labor tax wedge.
Substitute tax for capital gains arising from "extraordinary" operations, suchs as mergers, divisions, and transfers of companies.
6.40 0.41 Measure to favor restructuring, which brings higher depreciation charges (lower taxes) from corporates in the future. Subsitute tax on capital gains (lower rate) from revaluation of assets held on the balance sheet at historical cost.
4.18
0.27 Generates current revenue for the authorities in exchange for higher depreciation charges (lower taxes) from corporates in the future.
Sum of largest CIT tax expenditures. 33.08 2.11
1/ Full deduction of IRAP labor costs from PIT and CIT was introduced in Law 214/2011 and is not explicitly costed in the table, which instead includes estimates based on earlier lump-sum deductions per employee.
policy gap outlined below is a useful concept, as it measures a deviation from a benchmark that is deemed optimal.
17.
For the VAT, the shortfall of C-efficiency 6 from 100 percent can in principle be decomposed into terms relating to both the compliance gap and a "policy gap," reflecting the extent to which consumption is not actually taxed at the standard rate. For Italy, C-efficiency is estimated at around 41 percent in 2010-revenue was 41 percent of what it would have been had the then-standard rate been applied to actual taxable consumption. Combining this with a compliance gap of around 30 percent, as the studies of the Revenue Agency suggest, implies a policy gap also of around 41 percent. These calculations are illustrative, in that they derive from distinct data sources that are not fully comparable. Nonetheless, they give some sense of the relative potential of design and compliance improvements: halving the compliance gap, maintaining all tax rates unchanged, would thus raise about 1.3 percent of GDP; halving the policy gap, keeping the standard rate unchanged, would raise about 2.7 percent of GDP. (The policy gap can in turn be decomposed into elements reflecting rate differentiation and the operation of exemptions: Box 1 illustrates for Italy).
7
Box 1. Decomposing the IVA Policy Gap
De Mooij and Keen (2012) show that the policy gap can be further decomposed down as:
(
1-policy gap) = (1-exemptions)×(1-rate dispersion)
where the first term captures the impact of exemptions (sectors, activities), and the second measures the effect of non-standard VAT rates on collections (usually lower rates).
The recent report of the MEF on tax expenditures in Italy implies rate dispersion at about 0.25 percent; combined with a policy gap of 41 percent, this implies an "exemptions" gap of 0.22 percent in 2010. In percent of GDP (2010), this means lost revenue of 2.5 due to exemptions (including those mandatory under EU rules, which of course Italy cannot unilaterally remove), 2.9 due to lower rates, and 2.6 due to non-compliance. This leads to actual revenue collection of just over 6 percent of GDPas opposed to potential revenue, at an unchanged standard rate, of 15 percent of GDP.
6 C-efficiency is the ratio of VAT revenues to the product of the standard VAT rate and consumption. 7 Box developed from IMF (2012). 
18.
The largest VAT tax expenditures in the MEF report are the reduced rates (2.5 percent of GDP), consistent with a top-down decomposition of the VAT policy gap. 8 However, the estimated cost of exempt regimes from the decomposition of the policy gap (2.5 percent of GDP) is much larger than that found by the MEF (0.06 percent of GDP)-this is likely due to the unquantified miscellaneous exempt regimes, both national and ECmandated. Both groups of exempt regimes should be scrutinized. The MEF report also quantifies the cost of VAT reduced rates and some of the exempt regimes; these are summarized in Table 4 . 
Excise Tax
19.
The benchmark used in the MEF study is the legal tax system, although in principle, as excise taxes are designed to address externalities, one could assess the extent to which taxes fall short of the Pigouvian rate. Most excise tax expenditures are designed to provide some degree of competitive advantage to sectors that could be better achieved through other reforms-for example, structural reforms to reduce the cost of energy (see Table 5 ). 8 The MEF estimate of the cost of reduced rates (2.5 percent of GDP) differs slightly from the estimate in Box 1 (2.9 percent of GDP) due to differences in the estimated base of taxable consumption. 
Other taxes
20.
Some very large tax expenditures have already been removed with recent reforms. For example, the proposed revaluation of property cadastral values will eliminate previously identified tax expenditures related to property and transfers taxes (Eyraud, 2013) .
G. Which Tax Expenditures Should Be Reformed and How?
21.
Italy has a strong foundation to build on in terms of reforming tax expenditures. As mentioned, much work has already been undertaken on the identification and quantification of tax expenditures by the MEF. In addition, the draft tax reform law (Delega Fiscale) provides for the annual publication of a list of tax expenditures according to criteria and a methodology that will be supported by an external review body. This goes beyond the standards set out in the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency. 22.
Several other steps should be considered.
• • Particular caution is needed in aggregating tax expenditures, because the aggregate revenue gain from eliminating two tax advantages may differ from the sum of the gains from eliminating each in isolation.
23.
It is hard to identify up front how much could be saved from a thorough review. However, using the study already done, policy makers should consider priority reviews for tax expenditures that are not fully quantified (e.g. VAT exempt regimes); are poorly targeted (e.g. VAT reduced rates); are better covered by expenditure programs (e.g. for medical services); benefit only certain groups that also receive spending support (e.g. reduced VAT and excise tax for public transport companies and agriculture); and are distortionary (e.g. preferential treatment for government bonds). Table 6 provides an illustrative guide for priority review (it should be noted that savings will not equal the total estimate of the tax expenditure cost if it is to be replaced by a better targeted spending program or if the reduction is partial). Income tax credit for interest paid on mortgage for principal residence (or construction of principle residence).
1.34 0.09 A complete repeal could create budget difficulties for some households, so a review should proceed with caution focusing first on new mortgages. Reduced income tax rates on the interest and bonuses from government securities and other forms of public debt e.g. postal bonds.
1.38 0.09 Supports government bond market over other forms of investment.
CIT: substitute taxes to encourage restructuring, mergers and transfers.
13.83 0.88 Objectives potentially better achieved through structural reforms. Estimates should be treated with caution as some may be one-off. 
Selected Support for Agricultural Sector
